Date when decision was rendered: 27.8.1999

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2212; 1977/3/98

Reference to source

KHO 1999:49.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1999 II July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1999 II juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1999 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 2000

Pages: pp. 104-111

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6-1

Abstract

The county administrative court had dismissed X's appeal against a decision of a municipal board.X appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court asking for the reversal of the decisions of the board and the court and also asking for an oral hearing in the case.The Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of the county administrative court and returned the case to the latter court for an oral hearing.Following the new hearing, the county administrative court again dismissed X's complaint.X appealed against this new decision to the Supreme Administrative Court and claimed that there had been a procedural fault as the majority of the judges in the case before the county administrative court as well as the person presenting the case to the court had participated in the consideration of the case when it was decided by the court for the first time.

The Supreme Administrative Court noted that Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure was not applicable in this case.The said section provides, among other things, that a judge shall not act as a member of the court in a case if he or she has already decided or considered the same case as a member of another court.The Court then discussed at length the practice of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 6 of the ECHR concerning the independence and impartiality of a tribunal.The Court noted that subjective impartiality, i.e. whether a judge has acted in a biased or discriminatory manner against a party in a case, was not at issue in this case.It then discussed objective impartiality, i.e. whether the court proceedings seem impartial in the eyes of an objective outside observer.It referred to the view taken by the European Court of Human Rights concerning cases in which a higher court returns a matter to a lower court for new proceedings.According to this view, the judges of the lower court, who have acted as members of the court during the previous consideration of the case, are not always as such prevented from taking part in the new proceedings.However, there may be special features in the case which prevent the judge(s) from taking part in the new proceedings.

The conclusion of the Supreme Administrative Court was that in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights there were several features in this case which spoke for the impartiality of the judges.The case was returned to the county administrative court for an oral hearing, not because of a procedural fault.Therefore, X had no justified reason relating to the court proceedings to doubt the impartiality of the judges.The county administrative court was not legally bound by its previous decision in the matter and there were no such special features in the case which would have given reason to doubt the impartiality of the judges or their will or ability to take into account the new evidence presented during the oral proceedings.Considering the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it should also be noted that the decisions both in the first and second phase of the case were made by professional judges with legal training.Finally, it was possible to lodge an appeal against the decision before the Supreme Administrative Court which may consider both the legal and factual aspects of the case and arrange a new oral hearing if need be.

The Supreme Administrative Court concluded, that the fact that the composition of the court in the second phase of the case was nearly the same as when the court made its first decision in the same case, was not contrary to the Code of Judicial Procedure or Article 6 of the ECHR.

25.10.2002 / 10.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 18.12.1998

Judicial body: Vaasa Court of Appeal = Vasa hovrätt = Vaasan hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 1480 and 1481; S97/610 and S97/611

Reference to source

VaaHO 1999:1.

Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, judges,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, domare,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, tuomarit,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6-1

Abstract

The case was between a real estate company and a bank, and it concerned demands for payment.The company appealed to the Vaasa Court of Appeal against the decision of the court of first instance.There was reason to doubt the impartiality of the judge who had made the decision in the lower court because of the fact that he acted as supervisor in the bank.

The court of appeal referred to the relevant provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure, to the ECHR and to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights.It noted that a judge should not have a preconception of the case nor a desire to favor one of the parties in the case (subjective impartiality).Any justified doubts regarding the impartiality of the judge should be excluded (objective impartiality).With regard to objective impartiality, of relevance were, among other things, the previous activities of the judge and his or her relation to a party to the case.

A supervisor is not a member of the administrative organs of the bank and he has no real influence over the matters of the bank.However, he is expected to be loyal to the bank and should, among other things, participate in the efforts to improve the activities and market position of the bank.The court concluded that from the view of an objective outside observer, there was reason to doubt the impartiality of the judge.The court of appeal quashed the decision of the court of first instance and returned the case to the lower court.

On the same day, the same judge had made the decision of the court of first instance also in another case against the same company.The second case also concerned demands for payment but this time with a different plaintiff.The presentation of evidence in both cases was made during the same main session.The decision in both cases was based on the hearing of the same witnesses.The company appealed against the decision to the court of appeal claiming that there was reason to doubt the impartiality of the judge also in this second case.The court noted that the judge did not have any such relation to either of the parties which would have given reason to doubt his impartiality.However, under the circumstances it was clear that a judge, whose impartiality had been jeopardized in the first case, had formed such a relation to the second case, that an outside observer may have a reasonable doubt concerning the judge's impartiality.The court of appeal quashed the decision of the court of first instance also in this second case.The matter was returned to the lower court.

25.10.2002 / 27.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 24.2.1999

Judicial body: County Administrative Court of Häme = Tavastland länsrätt = Hämeen läänin oikeus

Reference: Report No. 136/6; 1742/5730/98

Reference to source

Electronic database FLOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FLOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FLOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

section 10 of the Act on Administrative Procedure

= lag om förvaltningsförfarande 10 §

= hallintomenettelylaki 10 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

The county administrative court had returned a matter to the county administrative board for a new consideration because of a procedural fault in the hearing of the parties before the board.In the county administrative board, the matter was decided by the same officials who had made the first decision in the same matter.One of the parties to the matter appealed to the county administrative court and asked the court to quash the board's decision, among other things, on account of the fact that the impartiality of the officials had been jeopardized as they had a preconception of the matter.The appealing party referred to the ECHR and to the case law of the Supreme Court.

The county administrative court noted that the ECHR and the case law of the Supreme Court, which had been presented in support of the appeal, concern the requirements of a fair trial and the impartiality of a judge.In this case, the matter had been considered in an administrative procedure by persons who acted as administrative officials, not as judges.The court pointed out that the requirements concerning impartiality in an administrative procedure are slightly different from those concerning the impartiality and independence of a tribunal.The relevant requirements are included in the Act on Administrative Procedure (section 10).The court noted that the Act does not mention any specific grounds which may jeopardize the impartiality of an official in a situation in which a matter is returned to a lower instance for a new consideration.In court practice, the provisions of the Act have not been interpreted to that effect either, for example, because of the influence of the ECHR.There is no reason to assume that in this case any personal motives of the administrative officials had had an effect in their decision in the matter.The court concluded that there is no reason to quash the decision on these grounds.

25.10.2002 / 10.10.2012 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 7.2.2000

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 0172; R 98/435

Reference to source

KKO 2000:13.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2000 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2000 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2000 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2000

Pages: pp. 56-62

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, judges,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, domare,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, tuomarit,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR 6 1

Abstract

A had acted as a legal counsel in a case before the court of first instance.The court had ordered a fee to be paid to him on the basis of the Cost-Free Court Proceedings act.At the request of the prosecutor, the court of appeal had reduced the fee.A appealed to the Supreme Court which quashed the decision and returned the matter to the court of appeal because the decision of the latter court did not cite the grounds on which it was based.The matter was considered by the appeal court in the same composition as the decision which the Supreme Court had quashed.A appealed against the new decision to the Supreme Court and claimed, among other things, that there was reason to doubt the impartiality of the appeal court.

The Supreme Court referred to Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure according to which a judge shall not act as a member of the court in a case if he or she has already considered the same case as a member of another court or has earlier decided something in relation to the matter.The Court noted that the provision as it stands does not apply to a case which has been returned to a lower court for new proceedings.The Court then referred to Article 6-1 of the ECHR and to the views of the European Court of Human Rights regarding, on the one hand, subjective impartiality, i.e. that a judge has no preconception of the matter nor any desire to favour one of the parties, and, on the other hand, objective impartiality, i.e. that the court proceedings seem impartial in the eyes of an objective outside observer.The Court also referred to the cases of Ringeisen v.Austria (judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A, No. 13), Dienne v.France (judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A, No. 325A) and Thomann v.Switzerland (judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 III, No. 11).It concluded that the impartiality of a court cannot automatically be in doubt if a case, which has been returned to the court for new proceedings, is decided by the same court members who made the first decision in the case.In this case, there was no indication that the court members would have had a personal bias regarding the matter.This was also not an appeal against the decision of the court of appeal but a case which had been returned to the lower court in order for the court to complement the grounds of the decision.No new facts could have been brought up in the new proceedings and the court could not change its decision to the disadvantage of A.The fact that the court both times reached the same decision does not indicate that there is reason to doubt the court's objective impartiality.The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the court of appeal and with the grounds cited in the decision.

One member of the Supreme Court submitted a dissenting opinion as far as the impartiality of the appeal court was concerned.In his opinion, when considering the grounds of the decision, the court could have ended up with a different decision had the court members not had a preconception of the matter and its end result.

28.10.2002 / 4.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 20.2.2000

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 0270; R99/250

Reference to source

KKO 2000:21.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2000 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2000 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2000 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2000

Pages: pp. 87-91

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6-1

Abstract

A, who worked for the municipality of X as an advisor in matters relating to housekeeping, had been convicted by the court of first instance for embezzlement of funds and for acting against official duties.A appealed against the decision and claimed, among other things, that the court had not been impartial when making the decision in the case as one of the lay judges of the court was employed by the municipality of X, the plaintiff in the case.The lay judge worked as a teacher.

The court of appeal referred to Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure according to which a lay judge shall not act as a member of the court if he himself has some part in the matter before the court.In view of Article 6-1 of the ECHR and the practice of the European Court of Human Rights relating to this provision, the court noted that a judge shall not have the desire to favour one of the parties in the case (subjective impartiality) and that any justified doubts regarding the impartiality of the judge or the court should be excluded (objective impartiality).It further referred to the case of Holm v.Sweden (judgment of 25 November 1993, Series A, No. 279) and to the relevant case law of the Supreme Court (KKO 1997:194).The court concluded that in their positions as employees of the municipality, A and the lay judge had worked under different municipal boards.The position of the lay judge as an employee of the municipality did not as such give reason to doubt the judge's impartiality.

A appealed to the Supreme Court which agreed with the appeal court.Also the Supreme Court noted the relevant provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure and the ECHR and discussed the notions of subjective and objective impartiality.It further brought up the fact that the lay judge was not a member of the governing bodies of the municipality and did not hold a position of trust in the municipality.Also, the duties of the lay judge as an employee of the municipality had nothing to do with the issue in the case against A, that is housekeeping.There was no reason to doubt the impartiality of the lay judge in this case.

See also European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 60963/00, decision on admissibility 23 March 2004 (inadmissible).

28.10.2002 / 10.5.2004 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 24.3.2000

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 0477; R99/107

Reference to source

KKO 2000:40.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2000 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2000 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2000 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2000

Pages: pp. 169-188

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, civil servants,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, tjänstemän,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, virkamiehet,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 15 and 45 of the State Civil Servants Act; Chapter 40, section 11 of the Penal Code; section 16 of the Constitution Act

= statstjänstemannalagen 15 §, 45 §; strafflagen 40 kapitel 11 §; grundlagen 16 §

= valtion virkamieslaki 15 §, 45 §; rikoslaki 40 luku 11 §; perustuslaki 16 §.

ECHR-6-1

Abstract

The case concerned the question whether three members of the water court had acted contrary to their official duties when they had enjoyed the hospitality of a water-power company in the form of food, drinks and accommodation.Such practice had been going on for several years and had happened mainly during inspections or other official missions, but in case of one member also during a holiday trip.At the same time, fairly controversial matters which concerned licence applications or compensation for damage and to which the water-power company was a party, had been pending before the water court.The three members of the court had participated in the consideration of these matters.

The Helsinki Court of Appeal considered the case as a first instance court mainly on the basis of the relevant provisions of the State Civil Servants Act and the Penal Code (concerning economic benefits which may endanger the impartiality of a state official and acting contrary to one's official duties).The three defendants were convicted.The court considered, among other things, the issue whether the kind of hospitality as had been provided by the water-power company could under some circumstances be regarded as normal and acceptable and whether it under other circumstances had endangered the trust in the impartiality of the court members.When discussing the question of impartiality, the court also referred to section 16 of the Constitution Act (right to a fair trial) and to Article 6-1 of the ECHR and noted that the impartiality of a court should be plausible also when reviewed by an outside observer.In this case, the impartiality of the court members had been jeopardized.

The defendants took the case further to the Supreme Court which dismissed some of the charges, mitigated the punishment of one defendant and waived the sentences of two defendants.In its decision, the Supreme Court did not refer to the ECHR.

28.10.2002 / 9.4.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 4.4.2000

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 0589; S98/1404

Reference to source

KKO 2000:49.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2000 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2000 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2000 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2000

Pages: pp. 231-234

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, judges,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, domare,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, tuomarit,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6-1

Abstract

The court of first instance had rejected A's application concerning the adjustment of A's debts.The bank, which claimed the debts, had objected to the application.A appealed to the court of appeal and claimed that there was reason to doubt the impartiality of the judge, who had acted as president of the court.The judge was married to a lawyer who was employed by the creditor bank.

The court of appel found that the there was no reason to doubt the judge's impartiality on the basis of the Code of Judicial Procedure.However, in view of Article 6-1 of the ECHR and the practice of the European Court of Human Rights there were reasons for such doubts as the judge had a close relation to the bank's lawyer.The court of appeal quashed the decision of the court of first instance and returned the case to the lower court.

The bank brought the case before the Supreme Court which referred both to the relevant provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure and to its own case law.The Supreme Court also discussed, more thoroughly than the appeal court had done, Article 6-1 of the ECHR and the practice of the European Court of Human Rights regarding subjective and objective impartiality.It concluded that the fact that the judge's husband was employed by the creditor bank did not alone constitute a reason to doubt the judge's impartiality.In his work as the bank's lawyer, the judge's husband did not deal with the adjustment of A's debts.Of relevance was, however, his position in the bank.He had the right to sign for the bank and to represent the bank.Thus, there was a relationship of trust between him and the bank which was stronger than in case of an ordinary employment relationship.Therefore, the judge's impartiality could have been in doubt.

Two dissenting members of the Supreme Court drew attention to the fact that the lawyer did not deal with matters relating to the adjustment of A's debts and that his right to sign for the bank was necessary in order for him to assess his duties.They concluded that the lawyer's position in the bank did not give reason to doubt his wife's impartiality as a judge in this case.

28.10.2002 / 4.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 31.10.2000

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2399; H98/171

Reference to source

KKO 2000:104.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2000 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2000 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2000 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2001

Pages: pp. 548-551

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, judges,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, domare,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, tuomarit,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 31, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 31 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 31 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

A had brought an action for damages against B before the court of first instance.While the case was pending, A had also filed an application in which he asked for the seizure of B's property as a precautionary measure.The court of first instance rejected A's application, but, on A's appeal, the court of appeal approved it.Later the court of first instance also rejected A's action for damages.After A's appeal, the court of appeal did not change the decision of the lower court.In his appeal, A claimed there was reason to doubt the impartiality of the lower court as one of the judges, who had made the decision concerning the action for damages, had earlier made the decision regarding A's application.

The Supreme Court rejected A's petition for leave to appeal.After this, A filed an extraordinary appeal asking for the annulment of the Supreme Court's decision as well as the reversal of the decision of the court of appeal because of the fact that the same judges of the appeal court had, in considering A's application, taken a stand concerning the grounds for the action for damages and had later considered A's appeal regarding the disqualification of the judge of the first instance court.

The Supreme Court stated that A had not presented any grounds upon which the decision concerning leave to appel should be annulled.Regarding impartiality, the Court referred to Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure which provides, among other things, that a judge shall not act as a member of the court in a case if he or she has already decided or considered the same case as a member of another court or has earlier made a decision relating to the matter.The Court also discussed impartiality in the light of Article 6 of the ECHR.It concluded as follows: The fact that a judge who considers the principal claim (in this case, the action for damages) has, as a member of the same court, earlier participated in the consideration of a precautionary measure in connection with the principal claim does not automatically constitute a reason to doubt the judge's impartiality.There was nothing to indicate that the members of the court of first instance or the appeal court had had a personal bias in the case.The decision concerning precautionary measures is based on evidence before the court at that time whereas the decision on the principal claim is based on evidence which is presented later during the main hearing and which the claimant may supplement and clarify if need be.When making the decision on the principal claim, the court is not bound by its decision concerning precautionary measures.Therefore, the latter decision could not have been a statement with regard to the evidence presented in the case as a whole and did not thus constitute a reason to doubt the courts impartiality.Furthermore, there was no reason for such doubts on the basis of the fact that the lower court had rejected both the application and the action for damages whereas the appeal court had approved the application but rejected the latter action.The fact that the appeal court had considered the claims concerning the disqualification of the judge of the lower court did not constitute a reason to doubt the appeal court's impartiality either.The Supreme Court rejected A's appeal.

In a dissenting opinion, one judge of the Supreme Court held that there was reason to doubt the impartiality of one of the judges of the first instance court, and A should therefore have been granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

28.10.2002 / 10.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 12.12.2001

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3091; 3490/3/00

Reference to source

KHO 2001:62.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2001 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2001 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2001 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2003

Pages: pp. 296-317

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

A water court (now: a regional Environment Permit Authority) had made its decision on an environment permit.A and B appealed against the decision to an administrative court.In their appeal, they also claimed that when making its decision, the water court did not appear to be impartial.Prior to the court's decision, the member who had presented the matter to the court had given a statement to the largest daily newspaper in the country.A and B claimed that on the basis of that statement it was possible to assess what the final decision of the court would be.The administrative court was of the opinion that the newspaper article did not contain any such statements which would give objectively justifiable grounds to doubt the court's impartiality.The court also dismissed the appeal in the main issue.

A and B appealed further to the Supreme Court.Concerning the impartiality of the water court, they referred to Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure which provides, among other things, that a judge is to be disqualified if he or she has considered the same matter as a member of another court.A and B interpreted this as an impression of the rule that a judge should not have a preconception of a case which he or she is to decide.They also claimed that considering Article 6-1 of the ECHR and the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the decision of the administrative court, as far as the impartiality question was concerned, was not based on established legal praxis.The Supreme Court quashed the decisions of the administrative court and the water court in the main issue and returned the case to the latter.Probably because of this, it did not take a stand on the question of impartiality in its decision.

29.10.2002 / 2.6.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 23.1.2001

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 130; S 99/694

Reference to source

KKO 2001:11.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2001 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2001 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2001 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2001

Pages: pp. 54-58

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, arbitration,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, skiljedom,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, sovittelu,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 9, 10, 40 and 41 of the Arbitration Act

= lag om skiljeförfarande 9 §, 10 §, 40 §, 41 §

= laki välimiesmenettelystä 9 §, 10 §, 40 §, 41 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

A dispute between advocate C and his clients A and B concerning C's fee had been resolved in arbitration at the request of A and B.The procedure had been carried out according to the rules of the Finnish Bar Association (The Finnish Bar Association By-Laws, 24 April 1959/191).The arbitrators had dismissed the case.A and B then brought action against C before a court of first instance.They asked the court to set aside or declare null and void the arbitration award on the grounds that there was reason to doubt the impartiality of two of the arbitrators.They were members of the Board of the Chapter of the Bar Association to which C also belonged.In addition, all three were advocates, and they lived and practiced their profession in the same town.A and B had found out about these circumstances only after the arbitration procedure had been completed.The court of first instance dismissed the claim.It noted that when A and B had chosen the arbitration procedure, they were aware of the rules of the Finnish Bar Association and of the possibility that advocates appointed as arbitrators could belong to the same Chapter of the Bar Association as the defendant C.According to the court, the other circumstances which A and B had referred to in their claim did not give cause to doubt the impartiality of the arbitrators.

A and B took the case to the court of appeal.The appeal court referred to Article 6-1 of the ECHR and to the provisions on impartiality in sections 9 and 10 of the Arbitration Act.It concluded that the procedure of appointing the arbitrators from among the members of the Board of the Chapter to which the defendant C also belonged, did not fulfill the requirement of impartiality and independence of arbitrators.The appeal court set aside both the decision of the first instance court and the arbitration award.C appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court also referred to sections 9 and 10 of the Arbitration Act as well as to Article 6-1 of the ECHR.It noted that in the case law interpreting Article 6 distinction was made between voluntary and compulsory arbitration.In this case, A and B had voluntarily chosen arbitration and had thus given up the possibility of a court procedure and the due process guarantees relating to a court procedure.By accepting arbitration according to the rules of the Finnish Bar Association, they had also accepted the fact that the arbitrators are advocates and that members of the Board of a Chapter of the Bar Association could be appointed as arbitrators.Consequently, they had given up the possibility to request the disqualification of the arbitrators on these grounds.On the other hand, they were not necessarily aware, that Board members of the Chapter to which C also belonged would be appointed as arbitrators in this case, nor that the arbitrators would live and practice their profession in the same town as C.However, according to the Supreme Court, these circumstances alone did not mean that the arbitrators and C would have a close relation or share the same interests in this particular matter.Therefore, there was no objective and justifiable cause to doubt the impartiality of the arbitrators on these grounds either.The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance.

29.10.2002 / 10.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 28.6.2001

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1391; S 99/134

Reference to source

KKO 2001:69.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2001 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2001 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2001 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2001

Pages: pp. 388-392

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, judges,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, domare,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, tuomarit,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

A bank had taken legal action against B and the company B owned in order to recover a loan.B lost the case in the court of first instance.The decision of the court was made by senior judge A.B appealed to the court of appeal.She claimed that the court had not been impartial as A acted as supervisor in the creditor bank.Some six months before the proceedings against B were initiated, A had told the bank that he wished to resign from his position as supervisor.However, he held his position formally until the end of his term, that is, also while the case against B was pending.In a statement submitted to the court of appeal, A said that he had learned about the loan granted to B only when the case against B was initiated.However, A was aware of bankruptcy proceedings in which B's husband had previously been involved.In his statement, A said that he was "slightly surprised" that a loan had been granted to B.B claimed that A thus had a preconception of the case against her.The court of appeal held that there was no objectively justified reason to doubt A's impartiality.B appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court first noted that there were no grounds to disqualify A on the basis of the provisions on impartiality in the Code of Judicial Procedure.The Court then discussed Article 6 of the ECHR, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights and the notions of subjective and objective impartiality.Reference was made, for example, to the cases of Wettstein (judgment of 21 December 2000) and Ferrantelli and Santangelo (judgment of 7 August 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decision 1996 III).In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the statement which A had submitted to the appeal court did not show that A had a preconception of the matter or any desire to promote the bank's interests (subjective impartiality).The Court then assessed A's objective impartiality.It noted that a supervisor had no position in the administration of the bank.However, according to the regulations of the bank, a supervisor shall, among other things, promote and control the activities of the bank.In the eyes of an outside observer, the tasks may raise doubts as to a certain bond of loyalty between the bank and the supervisor.However, the position of a supervisor does not include any specific obligations, and the modest compensation for the task constitutes no incentive to perform specific services for the bank.The actual role of the supervisor and the nature of the bond between the supervisor and the bank is very much dependent on the supervisor's own attitude and actions and may in practice be minimal.Before the case against B was initiated, A had resigned from his position as supervisor, specifically in order to prevent any possibility for doubts as to his impartiality as a judge.The Supreme Court held that although A formally held his position until the end of his term, it is justified to say that he had in fact given up his tasks as supervisor when handing in his resignation.The Court concluded that under the circumstances A's relation to the creditor bank did not raise any objectively justified doubts as to his impartiality.B's appeal was dismissed.

29.10.2002 / 14.2.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 28.2.2001

Judicial body: Insurance Court = Försäkringsdomstolen = Vakuutusoikeus

Reference: Report No. 9775:99

Reference to source

Electronic database for the decisions of the Insurance Court within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för försäkringsdomstolens beslut inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin vakuutusoikeuden päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, pension,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, pension,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, eläke,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

The Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kansaneläkelaitos; KELA) had granted A a disability pension under the national pension system.A appealed to a specific appellate board against the decision as far as it concerned the date starting from which the pension was granted.The board dismissed A's appeal.A appealed further to the Insurance Court and claimed, among other things, that there was reason to doubt the impartiality of a member of the appellate board.The member, B, had earlier participated in the decision-making concerning A's application for a disability pension submitted to the Local Government Pensions Institution (Kuntien eläkevakuutus) under the earnings-related pension scheme.The application had been rejected.

The Insurance Court first discussed impartiality on the basis of Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, which provides, among other things, that a judge is disqualified if he or she has participated in the handling of the same matter before another court or authority, is a party to the matter, or may expect to be benefitted or disadvantaged by the matter.The Court noted that KELA makes its decisions on the basis of the National Pensions Act and is not dependent on the decisions of pensions institutions, made under other, specific Acts.A person applying for a pension may find it difficult to understand that decisions made under the national pension system on the one hand and the earnings-related pension system on the other may differ from each other.This may result in an insufficient pension security for the applicant.That is why a certain uniformity of decisions is sought in legal practice, in spite of the fact that the two pension systems differ slightly with regard to the definition of disability applied in each system.Consequently, decisions made under the National Pensions Act may have an effect on the decisions by pensions institutions.The Insurance Court stated that as another pensions institution (Maatalousyrittäjien eläkelaitos, the Farmers' Social Insurance Institution) was mainly responsible for A's pension, the decision of the appellate board in A's case could not be expected to cause any specific benefit or damage to B or to the pensions institution he represented.B was not a member of the decision-making bodies of KELA nor employed by KELA.Disability pensions covered by two different pension systems could not be considered the same matter in the meaning of the impartiality provisions in the Code of Judicial Procedure.The Insurance Court concluded that B could not be disqualified on the basis of the Code of Judicial Procedure.

The Insurance Court then discussed Article 6 of the ECHR.It noted that nothing in the case indicated that there was reason to doubt B's subjective impartiality.However, there were grounds to suspect that B's objective impartiality had been jeopardized.B was the managing director of the Local Government Pensions Institution and had signed the decisions concerning A's pension.In fact, B had not participated in the handling of A's pension application.However, an outsider is not aware of the details of the decision-making procedure within the pensions institution.From an outsider's point of view, B's signature could indicate that B had participated in making the decision on the matter.Both the pensions institution and the appellate board dealt with A's disability.From A's point of view, they dealt with one and the same matter.The Court concluded, that A's doubts to the effect that B could have had a preconception of the matter could therefore be considered justifiable.

30.10.2002 / 12.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 15.1.2002

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 51; R00/1212

Reference to source

Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal

Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor

Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

A had been ordered to pay damages in a civil case.Later, A was charged with perjury in relation to his witness statement in the civil case and was convicted.A appealed against the latter decision to the court of appeal and claimed, among other things, that the chairperson of the court, judge B, should have been disqualified as she had had a preconception of the matter.B had been one of the three judges who had decided the civil case.

The court of appeal specified as legal grounds for its decision the provisions on the disqualification of judges in the Code of Judicial Procedure as they stood before the adoption of the amendment of 1 June 2001, taking also into account the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.The court referred to the cases of Ferrantelli and Santagelo v.Italy (judgment of 7 August 1996) and Rojas Morales v.Italy (judgment of 16 November 2000) and to the notions of subjective and objective impartiality.The court concluded that there was reason to doubt B's objective impartiality, as she could have had a preconception of the matter in the latter case.Although the legal issues in the two cases were different, B had to assess in both cases the significance of A's witness statement when deciding on the outcome of each case.The court of appeal quashed the decision of the court of first instance and returned the matter to the latter for a new consideration.The Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal in the case (decision of 18 June 2002).

9.5.2003 / 16.9.2003 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 30.12.2002

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3456; 3231/3/01

Reference to source

KHO 2002:91.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2002 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2002 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2002 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2005

Pages: pp. 686-690

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, sections 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §, 2 §, 6 § och 7 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §, 2 §, 6 § ja 7 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

The administrative court had dismissed X's appeal against a decision by the social welfare board concerning X's social assistance.Before the administrative court, X claimed that the members of the court and the referendary in the case should be disqualified as they had previously dealt with similar matters concerning X.The court dismissed the claim.X also said he/she would report the members and the referendary for an offence.The Supreme Administrative Court granted X leave to appeal as far as the impartiality of the court was concerned.

The Supreme Administrative Court referred to the provisions in the Code of Judicial Procedure concerning the impartiality of a judge.It also discussed briefly Article 6 of the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning subjective and objective impartiality.The Supreme Administrative Court noted that X's unilateral announcement that he/she would report the members of the court and the referendary for an offence, did not make X their adversary in a trial and did not give justified cause to doubt their impartiality in a matter concerning X's social assistance.The Court also noted that there was no reason to doubt that the members of the court or the referendary would have had a preconception of the case on the grounds that they had previously dealt with matters relating to X's social assistance.According to the Court, there was no specific reason to doubt the impartiality of these persons either.The Court concluded that there was no reason to disqualify the court members or the referendary on the basis of the Code of Judicial Procedure and that there had been no violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.X's appeal was dismissed.

9.5.2003 / 2.6.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 5.6.2001

Judicial body: Insurance Court = Försäkringsdomstolen = Vakuutusoikeus

Reference: Report No. 787:2000

Reference to source

Electronic database for the decisions of the Insurance Court within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen för försäkringsdomstolens beslut inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin vakuutusoikeuden päätöksiä sisältävä tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

The appeal board had rejected A's appeal against the decision of insurance company X in an accident insurance case.The Insurance Court quashed the decision of the appeal board, because there was reason to doubt the impartiality of a member of the appeal board, B.

B was not a member of the decision-making organs of insurance company X and was not employed by that insurance company.B could not be expected to benefit from the appeal board's decision, nor was that decision detrimental to B.Consequently, the Insurance Court concluded that B could not be disqualified on the basis of Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.The court then discussed Article 6 of the ECHR.It noted that there was nothing to indicate that B would have had a preconception of the matter or a desire to favour one of the parties in the case (subjective impartiality).However, the court considered that B's objective impartiality had been jeopardized.Insurance company X belonged to the same group of insurance companies as B's employer, retirement insurance company Y.Therefore, there was reason to doubt B's objective impartiality in a case in which insurance company X was a party, although B did not participate in the activities of that company.The Insurance Court quashed the decision of the appeal board and returned the matter to the board for a new decision in an impartial composition of the board.

6.8.2003 / 6.8.2003 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 14.5.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1163; 12/3/03

Reference to source

KHO 2003:24.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2003 January-June

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2003 januari-juni

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2003 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2005

Pages: pp. 250-256

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, sections 6 and 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; section 76 of the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 6 § och 7 §; förvaltningsprocesslagen 76 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 6 § ja 7 §; hallintolainkäyttölaki 76 §.

ECHR-6-1

Abstract

C, who was five years of age, had been taken into care by the decision of a municipal social welfare board.As the parents A and B objected to the decision, it was submitted to an administrative court.The court approved the decision and rejected the parents' appeal.A appealed further to the Supreme Administrative Court and claimed, among other things, that the expert member of the court, Y, should have been disqualified.Y was the director of a family advice bureau which was a unit under the social welfare board.Y was also the foreman of the psychologist, Z, who had given an expert opinion concerning C's health and development.

The Supreme Administrative Court first referred to the Administrative Judicial Procedure Act according to which the provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure concerning the disqualification of a judge are applicable to a person considering an appeal in an administrative court.In addition to the relevant provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the Court also discussed Article 6-1 of the ECHR and the notions of subjective and objective impartiality as specified in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.The Court found that Y's position as an official subordinate to the social welfare board or his position as Z's foreman did not in general and as such constitute grounds for Y's disqualification as an expert member of the court.However, in this particular case both these positions coincided.Furthermore, A had criticized the board and its officials for their inability to co-operate and to take into account the cultural and immigrant background of the family.Finally, C had been taken into care mainly because of C's own behaviour and problems, and thus Z's opinion had been of major importance when the administrative court had dealt with the case.The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that on these grounds Y's objective impartiality had been jeopardized to the extent that Y should have been disqualified as an expert member of the court.The decision of the administrative court was quashed and the case was returned to the administrative court for a new consideration.

16.4.2004 / 1.6.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 13.3.2003

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 524; M99/109

Reference to source

KKO 2003:16.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2003 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2003 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2003 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2003

Pages: pp. 73-76

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

= ECHR-6

Abstract

The land court had affirmed a construction plan for a private road.A had objected to the plan but his claim had been dismissed by the court.The Supreme Court did not grant A leave to appeal, but A submitted a complaint on the basis of a grave procedural error.One of the parties in the road construction plan, B, was the managing director of a company which had been given the task, as a consultant, to prepare a proposal for a shore plan.Two lay members of the land court owned land in that shore area.A claimed that the two members should have been disqualified as there was reason to doubt their impartiality when they were dealing with a matter in which B was a party.A referred to Article 6 of the ECHR and to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.The Supreme Court assessed the tasks of the consultant and noted that from the viewpoint of the land owners the consultant had a central, independent and influential role in the preparation of the shore plan.However, the Court continued, it is not rare that a judge has to deal with matters concerning a person whose actions again may affect matters concerning the judge's own person or property.This does not necessarily mean that there is an interdependent relationship between that person and the judge.In this case, it had not been claimed that the lay members would have expressed any particular wishes to B or that they would have had anything at all to do with B in matters relating to the shore plan.The shore area was vast, and there were thousands of land owners in that area.A consultant's relations with individual land owners could thus not have become very personal.The Supreme Court concluded that there was no reason to doubt the impartiality of the lay members on the grounds presented by A.A's complaint was dismissed.

21.4.2004 / 30.5.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 15.4.2004

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 853; VA2003/45

Reference to source

KKO 2004:42.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2004 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2004 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2004 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: 269-273

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal, ,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol, ,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin, ,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 1 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 1 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

An unemployment fund had granted A certain unemployment benefits.It turned out later that A had in fact been self-employed during that time.At the request of the unemployment fund, the Insurance Court had cancelled the decisions by which the fund had granted the benefits.The matter was returned to the unemployment fund for a new consideration.The fund made a new decision which was not favourable to A.A appealed against the decision to the Insurance Court.One member of the Insurance Court, B, participated in the consideration of A's case on both occasions.A appealed against the latter decision of the Insurance Court to the Supreme Court on the grounds that there was reason to doubt B's impartiality.The Supreme Court decided the case on the basis of the Code of Judicial Procedure and its provisions concerning the disqualification of judges, Article 6 of the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.With reference to the case of Gautrin and Others v.France (judgment of 20 May 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, pp. 1009-1041) the Supreme Court pointed out that a judge is assumed to fulfil the requirements of subjective impartiality unless proven otherwise.The Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of any proof there was no reason to doubt B's personal impartiality.B was a lay member of the Insurance Court and had been appointed to the task at the suggestion of the leading employers' associations in order to deal with specific cases pertaining to the Unemployment Security Act.A claimed that B was thus a representative of A's adversary and may have acted in the adversary's interests.The Supreme Court referred, among other things, to the Langborger case (judgment of 22 June 1989, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 155) and pointed out that the fact that a member of a court is nominated at the suggestion of certain interest groups is not as such contrary to Article 6 of the ECHR.The Court concluded that B's participation in the handling of A's appeal had not jeopardized the objective impartiality of the proceedings.Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the fact that B had previously dealt with an issue concerning A did not as such disqualify him from handling A's later appeal.The Court referred to the case of Morel v.France (judgment of 6 June 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-VI, pp. 281-302) and the case of Depiets v.France (judgment of 10 February 2004).It concluded that in A's case the Insurance Court had dealt with two separate legal issues and the court's decision on each case was not based on the same evidence.In the earlier proceedings, B could have received information about A's case in general.However, A's claim that B had a preconception as to how A's later appeal should be decided could not be regarded as objectively justified.The Supreme Court rejected A's appeal.

22.4.2005 / 30.5.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 18.2.2004

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 324; 3569 and 3637/3/02

Reference to source

KHO 2004:16.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2004 January-June

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2004 januari-juni

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2004 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2008

Pages: pp. 129-138

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act; section 52-2 of the Local Government Act

= lag om förvaltningsförfarande 10 §; kommunallag 52 § 2 mom.

= hallintomenettelylaki 10 §; kuntalaki 52 § 2 mom.

ECHR-6

Abstract

A municipal environmental protection committee had granted a permit for a quarrying project.Some opponents of the project appealed against the decision to the administrative court.They claimed, among other things, that there was reason to doubt the impartiality of the chairman of the committee, Z.Before the decision on the permit was made, Z had been interviewed in the press.In the interview, he had discussed the background of the quarrying project, its progress so far as well as the requirements for granting or not granting an environmental permit for this project.In the opponents' opinion, Z had in fact taken a positive view of the matter and could be regarded as an adversary to those who opposed the project.Therefore, he should have been disqualified when the decision on the permit was taken.

The administrative court referred to the grounds for disqualification of a public official as prescribed in section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.According to section 10-3, the grounds for disqualification also apply to any person who attends to the matter in a public authority in a capacity other than that of a public official.In the court's view, this included persons elected to a position of trust, that is members of a municipal committee.The administrative court also referred to Article 6 of the ECHR, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights as well as the notions of subjective and objective impartiality.The court noted that when deciding on environmental permits the municipal committee acted on the basis of the Environmental Protection Act.Issues pertaining to permits concern not only the rights and interests of the applicant but also those of other persons.Therefore, the court concluded, the committee made decisions which were comparable to those referred to in the ECHR.In his interview Z had given his opinion as to how the application for the permit for quarrying should be decided.The court concluded that Z's impartiality had been jeopardized "for some other special reason" as prescribed in section 10-1-6 of the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Supreme Administrative Court did not agree with the administrative court.It pointed out that the chairman of an environmental protection committee had a right to inform the media of important issues pending before the committee.Considering this, there was no reason to doubt Z's impartiality on the grounds presented in the decision of the administrative court.The Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of the administrative court and returned the matter to the lower court for a new consideration.In its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court did not discuss the distinction between the disqualification of a judge and that of a person elected to a position of trust.The decision did not include references to human rights treaties either.

25.4.2005 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 2.7.2004

Judicial body: Vantaa Court of First Instance = Vanda tingsrätt = Vantaan käräjäoikeus

Reference: Report No. 04/1809; R03/2782

Reference to source

Registry of the Vantaa Court of First Instance

Vanda tingsrätts registratorskontor

Vantaan käräjäoikeuden kirjaamo

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, independent and impartial tribunal,
rättvis rättegång, oavhängig och opartisk domstol,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, riippumaton ja puolueeton tuomioistuin,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 13, section 7-2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= rättegångsbalken 13 kapitel 7 § 2 mom.

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 13 luku 7 § 2 mom.

ECHR-6

Abstract

In a case before the court of first instance, 14 persons were charged with narcotics offences.Thirteen of them were convicted in the spring of 2004, whereas the trial of one accused, A, was postponed until the autumn of 2004.The same two judges who had decided the case in the spring, were to act as judges in A's case.A objected to this and claimed that the two judges should be disqualified as they had a preconception of the matter.

The court of first instance referred to the relevant provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure and to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Rojas Morales v.Italy (judgment of 16 November 2000).The court noted that in their decision in the spring the judges had accepted the prosecutor's claim that A was the leader of the group formed by the accused and that the other members of the group had taken orders from him.Considering that the other members of the group had been convicted, the judges had, in the court's view, also formed an opinion not only on A's guilt but also on the crimes A could be charged with (aggravated narcotics offence, instead of narcotics offence).A had not been heard before the judges made their decision in the case.With specific reference to the Rojas Morales case, which dealt with a similar situation, the court concluded that there were justifiable reasons to doubt the impartiality of the two judges.The decision is final.

25.4.2005 / 25.4.2005 / ASADINMA